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1 Introduction
Groups are ubiquitous in our lives. Committees link several individ-
uals united by a common purpose, a principle of organization, and a
set of rules and procedures. Like committees, courts and orchestras
are highly structured and appear to support a shared intentionality
and agency. Other groups seem much less cohesive: neither queues
nor multitudes appear to demand much of their individual members.
They must exemplify a certain spatial arrangement but they do not
seem to require a shared intentionality or agency from their mem-
bers. And there are of course many cases in between. The purpose
of this paper is to address the metaphysical question of what exactly
is a group. An answer to this question ought to accommodate some
of the differences mentioned above, and it should satisfy at least four
additional constraints.
We should first do justice to the observation that groups may have
their members temporarily and contingently. We join a committee
for a period of time, but fortunately, we are eventually allowed to
leave. Nor is it necessary that we join the committee; it would have
remained the same committee if someone else had joined instead.
Second, we should make allowance for coincidence. Two groups
may share exactly the same members at a given time. Two different
committees may coincide even if they are governed by a different
purpose, a different principle of organization, and a different set
of rules and procedures. The search committee and the graduate
committee may share exactly the same members throughout the
week. The very individuals who meet on Tuesday as the members of
the search committee may meet on Thursday as the members of the
graduate committee. This is not to say of course that the graduate
committee has met on Tuesday or that the search committee has met
on Thursday. Nor is it better to say that the search committee does
not exist when the graduate committee is in session — or vice versa.
We should, in the third place, explain what is for an individual
to be a member of a given group at a time. It would be better of
course if the account could illuminate the distinction between highly
structured groups with their apparent shared intentionality and
agency like committees and courts and apparently less cohesive
groups such as queues and multitudes.
Finally, we should, if we can, explain what is for a group to be
part of another. This, unlike group membership, appears to be an
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atemporal relation. The senior search committee is part of the search
committee throughout different changes in membership. Given the
allowance for coincidence, two groups may coincide at a given time
even if only one of them is part of a larger group: the senior search
committee is part of the search committee of which the junior search
committee is another part, but the mere fact that the search com-
mittee coincides with the graduate committee at a given time is not
enough of course to make the graduate committee part of the search
committee.
There is by now a large literature on the metaphysics of groups.
There is, first, the view that a group is nothing over and above their
members. Groups, on this view, are pluralities of individuals.1 One 1 It is often convenient to speak in the
singular of a plurality of objects to refer
in the plural to some objects. And
we likewise speak of an individual
object as a member of a plurality to
mean that the individual object is one
of them. Readers could in principle
eliminate all these uses in favor of
plural quantification and talk of the
relation an object bears to some objects
of which it is one.
challenge for this approach is to accommodate the first constraint:
if an individual is one of some individuals, then it is one of them
at all times and worlds at which they exist. And there is the fact
that pluralities are completely individuated by their members: two
pluralities differ only if they have different members. So, it is difficult
to accommodate the fact that different groups can share exactly the
same members.2
2 These points are discussed in great
detail in [Ritchie, 2013].
A more sophisticated approach has been defended by [Simons,
1987, 4.4]. An orchestra is given by some musicians as they satisfy
certain constitution conditions, which require to meet regularly to
play a certain array of instruments, and so on. This allows him to
accommodate that a musician may only temporarily and contingently
be a member of an orchestra, but questions remain: what makes
some musicians at one time be one and the same orchestra as some
other musicians at a later time? And how are we to explain group
coincidence? If some individuals satisfy the constitution conditions
associated with one and the other, then it is still not entirely clear
why we have two groups and not one.
Similar difficulties threaten the identification of a group with the
set of its members. There are, however, other alternatives in the vicin-
ity: [Effingham, 2010] has recently advocated the identification of
groups with sets — not of their members — of ordered pairs of
worlds and ordered pairs of times and sets of members. The ac-
count is tailor-made to explain how groups allow for variation in
their members across times and worlds, and it makes allowance for
two different groups to share exactly the same members at a given
time — and even at all times at a given world. But it does less well
with the third constraint: to be a member of a group at a given time
at a world is to appear in the second component of a certain ordered
pair in one of the ordered pairs in the set indexed by the relevant
world. The difference between a committee and a queue amounts to
a difference in extension, which is not very illuminating.
groups: toward a theory of plural embodiment 3
Next comes the identification of groups with fusions of their mem-
bers. One advantage of this view is that it construes groups as con-
crete material objects of a piece with their members. And indeed,
this may have been the predominant view of groups for some time.3 3 [Quinton, 1975] and [Macdonald and
Pettit, 1981] are cases in point.The identification of groups with fusions of their members eventually
fell out favor partly as a result of the work of David-Hillel Ruben in
[Ruben, 1983] and [Ruben, 1985]. But the approach is far from dead
and has recently been revived by [Hawley, 2017]. This general line
of attack is nevertheless very sensitive to the details of the general
conception of mereological composition in the background.
On a familiar model of composition, a fusion is partially identical
to its parts and moreover, has them eternally and necessarily if at all.
This makes the thesis no less problematic than the identification of
groups with their members. Moreover, this is a model of composi-
tion on which no two different fusions share exactly the same parts,
which makes it difficult to accommodate coincidence. Some philoso-
phers appeal to temporal parts in order to respond to some of these
problems: [Copp, 1984] and [Sider, 2001, pp. 151-2] have defended
the identification of groups with fusions of temporal parts. But it is
less clear that they are able to satisfy some of the other constraints we
set for ourselves: one challenge, for example, is to illuminate the dis-
tinction between a committee and a queue, which for them, is merely
a different in parts.
We do better if we set the proposal against the background of a
hylomorphic conception of composition, one on which at a given
time, a queue, for example, consists of a composite material object
whose immediate parts are individual members as they are unified
by a certain complex spatial relation and a common purpose. We will
in fact describe such a proposal in detail as a stepping stone towards
the proposal to be defended in this paper.
This brief summary is far from exhaustive. We would be remiss
if we did not mention at least two more options. Some philosophers
have appealed to the concept of constitution: groups are not sets of
individual members, but they are constituted by them. This relation
is supposed to be akin to material constitution, which is the relation
that a statue, for example, bears to the portion of clay of which it is
made. Much like the statue is less closely tied to its parts than the
clay is, [Uzquiano, 2004], that groups are less closely tied to their
members than sets are to their elements. Different accounts of the
relation a group bears to the set of its members are in line with dif-
ferent accounts of material constitution: [Epstein, 2015] has recently
advocated an account of group constitution in terms of how facts to
do with groups are grounded on facts to do with their individual
members. There is a price to pay in each case: groups are complex
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objects of an unfamiliar sort, since they cannot quite be identified
with material objects or sets thereof.
More recently, [Ritchie, 2013] has taken groups to be concrete re-
alizations of abstract structures. A committee exemplifies an abstract
structure, which includes nodes for the occupants of different roles
in the committee and stipulates that certain relations obtain between
them. There is a question as to whether this concrete realizations of
abstract structures are more familiar objects than the complex ob-
jects posited by constitution theorists. And the view appears to be
tailor-made to deal with committees and courts but less well suited to
accommodate queues and multitudes.
While some accounts do better than others with the constraints
outlined at the outset, most of them fail to do justice to the judgment
that at a given time, a queue is nothing over and above some indi-
viduals as they stand in line for a certain purpose. Maybe there is a
reason for this. One could be forgiven to think the task is unattain-
able: no answer to the question of what is a group can satisfy the
constraints we lay out at the outset and nevertheless do justice to the
judgment that at a given time, a group is nothing over and above
some individuals as they exemplify a certain complex condition. One
of the primary purposes of this paper is to suggest otherwise.
This is of course a tall order. So, we proceed in two steps. We first
articulate a hylomorphic conception of groups that promises to sat-
isfy the initial four constraints but does less well with the judgment
in question. This first pass cannot be the end of the story for another
reason: we will eventually argue that given reasonable assumptions,
it leaves us on the brink of inconsistency. The second step is to offer
a structurally similar account designed to reap all the benefits of the
initial account and nevertheless accommodate the judgement that a
group at a given time, is nothing over and above some individuals as
they exemplify a certain complex condition.
2 Hylomorphism and its limits
On a hylomorphic mode of composition, at a given time, some ma-
terial objects compose another as they stand in a certain relation to
each other. There are rival accounts of hylomorphic composition in
the market, but the theory of embodiments outlined by [Fine, 1999]
appears tailor-made for our purpose.4 There are two main ingredi- 4 See [Koslicki, 2008] and [Goodman,
2016] for alternative versions of hylo-
morphism.
ents to the account. According to Fine, some material objects a, b, c, ...
and a relation R may be combined into a rigid embodiment where
they are qualified by the relation R: the rigid embodiment a, b, c, .../R
only exists when the material objects a, b, c, ... exist and are linked by
the relation R. On this view, a, b, c, ... are immediate material parts
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of a, b, c, .../R, and R is a formal part of it: a water molecule consists
of two hydrogen atoms h1, h2 and an oxygen atom o linked by cer-
tain covalent bonds, h1, h2, o/M. The atoms h1, h2, o are its immediate
material parts, and the molecular structure M is a formal part. Suits,
clusters, and bouquets are further putative examples of rigid embod-
iments. In each case, a rigid embodiment consists of some objects,
which we may call its immediate material parts, and the relation they
exemplify. They are called rigid because they have their immediate
material parts necessarily if at all. In this respect, rigid embodiments
seem different from groups, which generally have their members
only temporarily and contingently.
Groups are closer to what Fine calls variable embodiments. Given a
condition F that applies to exactly one material object at each given
time, Fine writes /F/ for the variable embodiment that is manifested
at a time by whatever exemplifies condition F at it.5 Given an ap- 5 This is not very far apart from the
view defended by [Ritchie, 2013].
Think of a variable embodiment as
the realization of a structure, which
is manifested at each time at which
it exists by the occupants of different
nodes in the structure.
propriate choice of condition F, we may conceive of a committee as
a variable embodiment, which at a given time t consists of a rigid
embodiment of individuals bound by condition F. This allows for
other groups to be bound by less cohesive relations. The members of
a queue are bound by a complex condition, which, at a given time, is
satisfied by whatever individuals exemplify a certain spatial arrange-
ment as they wait for a certain purpose.
The hylomorphic account of groups appears to fulfill many of our
desiderata. Many groups have their members only temporarily and
contingently. The members of a variable embodiment at a given time
are the immediate material parts of the rigid embodiment that consti-
tutes it at the time. But since one and the same variable embodiment
may be constituted by different rigid embodiments at different times
and worlds, there is room for groups to change their members across
times and worlds.
Second, the account makes allowance for coincidence. Two rigid
embodiments may at a given time, consist of exactly the same mem-
bers and nevertheless remain different on account of the fact that
they are unified by different relations. The search committee and the
admissions committee may at a given time, be constituted by two
rigid embodiments with the same members.
In the third place, the present account of what it is for an individ-
ual to be a member of a group at a given time appears to illuminate
the distinction between highly structured groups like committees
and courts and less cohesive groups like queues and multitudes. In
order to be a member of a committee at a given time, one must stand
in a rather complex relation to all the other individuals in a certain
rigid embodiment, and the fact that they stand in that relation may
be brought to bear on the question of whether they exhibit shared
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intentionality and agency. In contrast to this, in order to be a member
of a queue at a given time, one need only stand in a certain spatial
relation to the other individuals in the queue as they wait for a cer-
tain purpose. This relation, you may think, need not support the
emergence of a shared intentionality or agency.
Last, but not least, the account may be supplemented with an ac-
count of atemporal mereological relations on the domain of rigid
and variable embodiments.6 When properly fleshed out, this ac- 6 See [Fine, 1999] for an example of such
an account.count should enable us to make a distinction between the variable
embodiment parts of a variable embodiment and other variable em-
bodiments that merely coincide with them.
But this is not the account we want to defend in this paper. One
reason is that we still lack the means to do justice to the judgment
that at a given time, a queue is nothing over and above some individ-
ual members as they stand in line for a certain purpose. This is what
made the account outlined by [Simons, 1987, 4.4] quite attractive in
the first place.
The other reason is a threat of inconsistency. Hylomorphic ac-
counts of composition generally come with existence and identity
conditions for rigid embodiments. The existence conditions specify
the conditions under which some material objects linked by a rela-
tion give rise to a rigid embodiment. The identity conditions for rigid
embodiments tell us what it takes to identify two rigid embodiments.
The problem we have in mind is illustrated by the postulates found
in [Fine, 1999]. The first postulate aligns with the thought that there
are no restrictions on hylomorphic composition:
Rigid Existence: If some material objects a, b, ... stand in relation R
at some world-time, then there is a rigid embodiment a, b, .../R,
which exists at a world-time if and only if a, b, ... stand in R at the
world-time.7
7 Talk of world-times is shorthand for
quantification over pairs of worlds and
times.
The second postulate tells us that two rigid embodiments are the
same if, and only if, they consist of the same individuals as they are
bound by the same relation:
Rigid Identity: The rigid embodiment a, b, .../R is the same as the
rigid embodiment a′, b′, .../R′ if and only if a = a′, b = b′, ... and R
is the same as R′.8
8 [Fine, 1999] acknowledges that the
requirement that the relation R be the
same as R′ makes rigid embodiments
more fine-grained than one may like.
He suggests we may instead require
only that the state of affairs consisting
of a and b as they stand in R be the
same as the state of affairs consisting of
a and b as they stand in R′.
One consequence of the identity postulate is the following:
Rigid Extensionality: The rigid embodiment a, b, .../R is the same as
the rigid embodiment a′, b′, .../R′ only if a = a′, b = b′, ....
The postulates turn out to be inconsistent with the existence of more
than one material object.9
9 The two claims are consistent with the
existence of a single material object. For
given a singleton domain {a}, we may
let a = a/R for every relation R.
Given more than one material object,
define a relation E that relates x and
y at a world/time iff there are some
material objects a, b, ... such that x is
one of them and y = a, b, .../R for some
relation R. By existence, given some
objects a, b, ... , there is some y such
that for every x, x stands in E to y iff
x is one of a, b, .... This contradicts a
theorem of plural logic:
∃x∃yx 6= y→ ¬∀xx∃y∀x(Rxy↔ x ≺ xx).
This theorem tells us that given two
objects, it is not possible for a binary
relation R to inject pluralities into
objects — or, given the usual gloss,
there are more pluralities than objects.
For discussion and a proof of the
theorem, see [Florio, 2014, section 5].
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We face a choice. We must weaken either the existence or the
identity postulate. But while a restriction of the existence postulate
may perhaps be motivated by common sense, it appears to lead to
vague and intolerably arbitrary answers to the existence question.10 10 This is part of the motivation [Fine,
1999] cites for the existence postulate.Maybe this is not, in the end, a decisive concern.11 But to the extent
11 [Korman, 2010] responds to the
argument from arbitrariness, and
[Koslicki, 2008] builds a restriction
of existence into her own version of
hylomorphism. Moreover, [Fine, 2007]
argues that some arbitrary restriction
on principles like the rigid existence
postulate becomes unavoidable when
we consider their interaction with other
sorts of objects
to which one is moved by arbitrariness concerns, one should look
elsewhere for a response.
The other horn of the dilemma is to weaken the identity postulate
in order to allow for the identification of rigid embodiments with dif-
ferent immediate material parts: one and the same rigid embodiment
may be specified as a, b, .../R and a′, b′, .../R, where a, b, ... are differ-
ent material objects from a′, b′, .... This means that a, b, .../R exists at
a world-time w if and only if a′, b′, .../R does. What if R is trivially
satisfied by any objects provided they exist? We will find that dif-
ferent pluralities of material objects a, b, ... and a′, b′, ..., will have to
be intimately entangled in that they exist at exactly the same world-
times. This might perhaps be tolerable if it could be a localized phe-
nomenon. But it would unfortunately have to be quite widespread.12 12 Take a relation D in which some
objects stand if and only if they are all
distinct from each other. If the domain
of material objects is a set, then we are
committed to the claim that distinct
sets of material objects give rise to one
and the same rigid embodiment under
D. It is a consequence of the Zermelo-
König inequality that at least one rigid
embodiment corresponds to as many
different sets of material objects under
D as there are sets of material objects
altogether. This seems a stiff price to
pay in exchange for consistency.
3 A Theory of Rigid Plural Embodiment
The dilemma presupposes that embodiments are themselves mate-
rial objects over and above their immediate material parts: a water
molecule, we think, is a material object over and above two hydrogen
atoms and an oxygen atom qualified by a certain molecular structure.
But we now set out to make room for the concept of a rigid plural
embodiment, one which consists of some objects linked by some
plural condition, for example, two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen
atom as they exemplify a certain molecular structure.
In what follows, we focus on the viability of an account of rigid
plural embodiments. We aim to formalize the approach in an exten-
sion of plural logic. We will generally let plural variables, mm, to
refer to some material objects, and we will consider plural conditions
A(mm) these objects may satisfy. Some of them may include irre-
ducibly collective predications such as “mm are arranged in a circle”
or “mm are scattered”. Two postulates give existence and identity
conditions for rigid plural embodiments:
Rigid Plural Existence: If some material objects mm satisfy a plural
condition A at a world-time, then there are some material objects
mm/A, which exist at a world-time iff mm satisfy R at the world-
time.
Rigid Plural Identity: Some material objects, mm/A, are the same
as some material objects, nn/B if and only if a material object is
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one of mm if and only if it is one of nn and necessarily, for any
material objects xx, A(xx) if, and only if, B(xx).
Think of mm/A as some material objects mm as qualified by a plural
condition A — or some material objects mm qua A, for short.13 For a 13 The plural conception of rigid embod-
iments is not unlike a plural generaliza-
tion of Fine’s conception of qua-objects
in [Fine, 1982]: qua-objects are objects
under a certain description. The dif-
ference is that we now allow for some
objects in the plural to be qualified by a
plural condition.
concrete example, consider a rigid plural embodiment given by two
hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom qua linked by certain covalent
bonds.14
14 Note, however, that the thesis that the
three atoms and the relevant molecular
structure form a rigid plural embod-
iment is itself neutral with respect to
whether we should think of the water
molecule as a complex object over and
above the rigid plural embodiment.
Some philosophers, for example, [Mer-
ricks, 2001] and [van Inwagen, 1990],
deny the existence of a wide range
of composite objects and paraphrase
unreflective talk of composites in terms
of plural quantification over simples.
Maybe they could be tempted to use of
the concept of plural embodiment in
order to make do without composite
objects over and above their parts, but
whatever the prospects of this move, it
is beyond the remit of this paper.
Given some individuals, there is generally more than one rigid
plural embodiment of which they are members. There is Alice, Beth,
and Charles as they stand next to other, and there is Alice, Beth, and
Charles as they remain in close proximity to each other. These rigid
plural embodiments are different because they exemplify different
modal profiles: they can remain in close proximity even if they do
not stand next to each other. On the other hand, they must remain
in close proximity to each other if they are to stand next to each
other. There is a sense in which the first rigid plural embodiment
is more fragile than the second: the second could exist without the
first one, but not vice versa. As a limit case, there is what we may call
the bare plurality of Alice, Beth, and Charles, which is a rigid plural
embodiment that exists provided only that they exist.15
15 You may think of the bare plurality
of Alice, Beth, and Charles as the rigid
plural embodiment that consists of
them as they exist and remain different
from each other.
We may give a more precise characterization of the modal profile
of a rigid plural embodiment. A function f from world-times to sets
of individuals in them is defined for a world-time w if, and only if,
f (w) 6= ∅. A rigid modal profile is a function f from world-times to
sets of individuals in them, which (i) is defined for some world-time,
and (ii) outputs the same set of individuals at any world-time for
which it is defined.16 A rigid modal profile f corresponds to a rigid 16 More formally, f is a rigid modal
profile if, and only if, (i) f (w) 6= ∅ at
some world w, and (ii) for any world-
times w and w′, if f (w) 6= ∅ and
f (w′) 6= ∅, then f (w) = f (w′).
plural embodiment mm/R if, and only if, f maps a world-time w to
the set of members of mm if, and only if, mm satisfy condition A at
w.17 If plural conditions A and B are necessarily coextensive, then the
17 Recall the convention to speak of
the members of a plurality to mean
the objects each of which is one of the
objects in the plurality.
rigid plural embodiments mm/A and mm/B exemplify one and the
same rigid modal profile.18 Against this backdrop, the rigid existence
18 As usual, A and B are necessarily
coextensive, if necessarily, no matter
what some xx may be, A(xx) if, and
only if, B(xx).
and identity postulates come down to this:
Each rigid modal profile is exemplified by a unique rigid plural embodi-
ment.
Matters are different for rival accounts of the identity conditions
for rigid plural embodiments. Should you require more than mere
necessary equivalence of conditions A and B for the two rigid plural
embodiments to be the same, you would find that many different
rigid plural embodiments could exemplify one and the same rigid
modal profile.19 19 More fine-grained accounts of rigid
plural embodiments are the next step
in the area. We will, however, take it
one step at a time by seeking some
assurance of the coherence of the
coarse-grained account of rigid plural
embodiments.
We regiment the account of rigid plural embodiments in a many-
sorted extension of plural quantified modal logic.
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3.1 A Formal Framework
Plural logic is regimented in a two-sorted first-order language with
individual variables, x, y, z, ..., plural variables, xx, yy, zz, ..., and two
primitive predicates: x ≺ yy, read: “x is one of yy”, and x = y is
read: “x is identical with y”. In addition to this, we allow a stock of
non-logical predicates into the language some of which take plural
variables as arguments.
We want to extend the framework to allow for quantification over
rigid plural embodiments — in addition to individuals and bare
pluralities. Since bare pluralities are a special case of rigid plural
embodiments, one may be tempted to keep the framework two-sorted
and allow plural variables to range over rigid plural embodiments.
This choice would be parallel to the one made by theorists who
regiment plural logic as a one-sorted framework.20 Since individuals 20 [McKay, 2006] is a case in point.
are a special case of a plurality — a plurality of a single individual
— and plural variables may be thought to range over individuals
and pluralities.21 But while the simplicity of a one-sorted framework 21 [McKay, 2006, Chapter 13, section 3]
outlines this route in quite some detail.
His regimentation of plural logic begins
with the atomic predicate xx  yy,
read: “xx are among yy” and defines
a plural predicate Ixx, read: “xx are
one in number,” as an abbreviation for:
∀yy(yy  xx → xx  yy). One is
then in a position to introduce a “one
of” predicate in terms of “among”
and proceed to formulate the usual
principles of plural logic in a one-sorted
framework.
is sometimes attractive, a two-sorted framework still allows for a
more perspicuous formalization of the axioms fo plural logic. And
this, I think, explains the sociological fact that many still opt for a
two-sorted formalization of plural logic.
In the case at hand, there is a similar trade off between the sim-
plicity of a two-sorted framework and the lack of perspicuity of the
corresponding regimentations of rigid plural existence and identity.22
22 Indeed, since individuals themselves
are special cases of bare pluralities
and bare pluralities are rigid plural
embodiments, we could in principle
make do with a one-sorted framework,
though one that is not particularly
perspicuous.
So, we will reserve xx, yy, zz, ... to range over bare pluralities and
introduce a new style of plural variable, xx, yy, ..., for rigid plural
embodiments. We supplement the new three-sorted language with
another primitive predicate: x ≺ yy, read: “x is one of yy.”23 It will
23 We take “one of” to be implicitly
relativized to world-times.
be helpful to introduce two defined predicates: xx  yy as an abbre-
viation for: ∀x(x ≺ xx → x ≺ yy), and xx ≡ yy, as an abbreviation
for: xx  yy ∧ yy xx.
We take bare pluralities to be governed by the usual axioms of plu-
ral logic. In particular, we assume an axiom of plural comprehension:
∃x A(x)→ ∃xx∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ A(x)), (Comprehension)
provided xx does not occur freely in A(x). Given a condition A, there
are some objects, which are all and only the objects that satisfy the
condition. This is an important difference between pluralities and
sets. While the condition non-self-membered determines a plurality of
all and only non-self-membered objects, we know all too well that
there is no set of them on account of Russell’s paradox.
And we assume, as usual, that bare pluralities are extensional:
xx ≡ yy→ (A(xx)↔ A(yy)). (Extensionality)
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This is motivated by the thought that bare pluralities are completely
determined by its members. One may then define a plural identity
predicate xx == yy to abbreviate: xx ≡ yy.
Unlike bare pluralities, plural embodiments are not extensional.
Alice, Beth, and Charles as they stand next to each other share all
their members with Alice, Beth, and Charles as they talk to each
other, but the two rigid plural embodiments remain different as they
exemplify different modal profiles. So, we cannot define quasi-plural
identity, xx == yy, in terms of xx ≡ yy. Instead, we will take the
identity == predicate for rigid plural embodiments to be primitive
and and governed by a quasi-plural indiscernibility principle.24 24 The mere addition of quasi-plural
variables is no obstacle for consistency:
to construct a model we may simply
let quasi-plural variables range over
the same domain as the original plural
variables. Even if you take the new
variables to be governed by the non-
extensional fragment of plural logic, the
key observation is that any model of the
classic logic of plurals is itself a model
of the non-extensional fragment.
xx == yy→ (A(xx)↔ A(yy)). (Indiscernibility)
In order to regiment the rigid plural existence and identity pos-
tulates, we supplement the framework with a modal operator 2 for
metaphysical necessity governed, as usual, by the axioms of the min-
imal normal modal logic K. Now, admittedly, the simplest modal
plural quantificational logic — with identity — and necessitation
allows one to derive instances of what is sometimes known as the
"Necessary Necessity of Existence":
2∀α2∃β α = β (NNE)
where α and β stand for variables of the same sort.25 When we sub- 25 Since ∃β α = β is a theorem for
each style of variable, necessitation
delivers 2∃β α = β and the appropriate
rule of universal generalization yields
∀α2∃β α = β. We obtain (NNE) by
another application of necessitation.
stitute plural variables for α and β, we have the claim that necessarily,
no matter what some objects may be, they exist necessarily.26
26 Necessitists generally adopt a con-
stant domain model theory for quan-
tified modal logic that validates all
instances of the Converse Barcan (CBF)
and the Barcan (BF) schemata:
2∀αA(α)→ ∀α2A(α) (CBF)
∀α2A(α)→ 2∀αA(α), (BF)
where α and β stand again for variables
of the same sort.
Some embrace the derivability of (NNE) as evidence for neces-
sitism — the view that necessarily, every object exists necessarily.
But even necessitists should acknowledge a difference between ob-
jects that enjoy the sort of concrete existence exemplified by ordinary
blades and handles and the merely possible knives that could have
been built from them. In this vein, they may attempt to do justice to
ordinary judgments of existence by means of a stock of concrete ex-
istence predicates Eα for each style of variable. This is, incidentally,
why (NNE) need not wreak havoc with the thought that a plural
rigid embodiment mm/A may not exist at a world-time w if mm fail
to satisfy the plural condition A(xx) at w: a plural rigid embodiment
consisting of a blade and a handle as they are joined together will
at w not enjoy the same concrete existence as the relevant blade and
handle unless they are in fact joined together at w. A necessitist will
simply recast the thought as one to do with concrete existence: the
rigid plural embodiment exists necessarily, but it does not necessarily
enjoy concrete existence.
Contingentism is the denial of necessitism — the view that pos-
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sibly some objects do not exist necessarily. Many contingentists re-
ject classical quantificational logic in response to the derivability of
(NNE): they often weaken universal instantiation and introduce exis-
tence predicates Eα for each style of variable to align with the range
of the relevant quantifier: ∃β α = β. 27 Even if there are handles and 27 Universal instantiation is the axiom:
∀αφ → φ[β/α] in which β is supposed
to be free for α in φ. [Cresswell and
Hughes, 2012] outline some restrictions
of the principle that would enable
contingentists block the derivation of
(CBF) and (NNE) as well as the validity
of (BF).
blades, there are no merely possible knives, which could have — but
are never — built from them.
But even contingentists fall back into talk of merely possible
knives, and more importantly, many of these superficially problem-
atic claims appear to track and communicate sensible modal truths.
The official line of course is to disavow the literal truth of such state-
ments and to hope to eventually be able to dispense with them with
the help of a systematic method of paraphrase.28 In the meantime, 28 According to [Fritz and Goodman,
2017], the prospects for a completely
general method of paraphrase are
bleak, since the best proposals rely on
substantial assumptions that are in
tension with other contingentist tenets.
we may grant contingentists a distinction between inner or actualist
quantifiers governed by free quantificational logic and outer or possi-
bilist quantifiers governed by classical quantificational theory.29 Inner
29 [Bricker, 1989] provides a concrete
example of how contingentists can
make profitable use of outer or possi-
bilist quantifiers for certain theoretical
purposes.
quantifiers track the domain of what exists, and outer quantifiers are
used to simulate talk of merely possible objects.
Necessitists and contingentists agree that to exist in the most gen-
eral sense of the word is to be something. But some sever the link be-
tween quantification and existence. Socrates, they say, is something,
but he no longer exists since he has been dead for a while now. On
this view sometimes known as noneist, (NNE) is still a theorem, just
not a statement of the necessary necessity of existence. [Lewis, 1990]
and [Priest, 2005] discuss similar positions. This provides yet a differ-
ent interpretation of the formalism on which the most general sense
of existence is to be tracked by means of the existence predicates —
as opposed to quantification and identity.
The debate between necessitism and contingentism is orthogonal
to the viability of an account of rigid plural embodiments. In what
follows, we adhere to classical quantificational logic with identity and
introduce a stock of existence predicates Eα for each style of variable.
If you are a necessitist, read Eα as: “α has concrete existence”. On the
other hand, if you are a contingentist, read the quantifiers to be outer
quantifiers designed to simulate quantification over merely possible
objects and think of Eα as the broadest existence predicate, which, for
you, aligns with the range of the inner quantifiers.30 30 In what follows, I will simply read
Eα as "α exists" with the understanding
that necessitists and contingentists will
interpret it as concrete and absolute
existence respectively.
Whatever your sympathies, you will presumably take E to be gov-
erned by a heredity principle according to which that the existence of
a bare plurality or a rigid plural embodiment entails the existence of
each individual member:
2(Eα→ ∀x(x ≺ α→ Ex)) (H≺)
where α is a placeholder for either a plural or quasi-plural variable.
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Two rigidity axioms describe a feature bare pluralities and rigid
plural embodiments have in common:
x ≺ α→ 2(Eα→ x ≺ α)
x ⊀ α→ 2(Eα→ x ⊀ α) (R)
Bare pluralities cannot change their members: if Alice is one of some
people, then necessarily, she is one of them, if they exist. And if she
is not one of them, then she can never be one of them. But rigid
plural embodiments share this feature: if Alice is one of Alice, Beth,
and Charles as they stand next to each other, then necessarily, if they
she is necessarily one of them as they stand next to each other. And
if she is not on of them as they stand next to each other, then she can
never be one of them as they stand next to each other.
One key difference between bare pluralities and rigid plural em-
bodiments is that they come with different existence conditions.
While a bare plurality exists at a world-time if, and only if, the
members do, there is no guarantee that a rigid plural embodiment
should exist at a world-time even if the members do: Alice, Beth, and
Charles can exist at a world-time even if the rigid plural embodiment
of Alice, Beth, and Charles as they stand next to each other fails to
exist. In symbols, we endorse another heredity principle:
xx ≡ α→ 2(Eα→ Exx). (H≡)
But we cannot reverse the conditional embedded in the consequent.
We can finally offer formal regimentations of the plural existence
and identity postulates. Here is a schematic formalization of rigid
plural existence:
(Exx ∧ A(xx))→ ∃xx(xx ≡ xx ∧2(Exx ↔
(Exx ∧ A(xx)))) (R-Existence)
To make it vivid, consider a non-distributive plural condition like
xx are arranged in a circle. According to (R-Existence), if some objects
exist and they are arranged in a circle, there are some objects—which
are a rigid plural embodiment—with the same members as them, and
which, necessarily, exist if, and only if, each of them exists and they
are arranged in a circle.31 31 Notice the implicit role of (R) in
the regimentation of the existence
postulate. Without it, (R-Existence)
cannot guarantee that xx has any
members at worlds other than the
world of evaluation.
We individuate rigid plural embodiments by their existence con-
ditions: in particular, we identify rigid plural embodiments with the
same existence conditions:
xx == yy↔ xx ≡ yy ∧2(Exx ↔ Eyy) (R-Identity)
The combination of (R-Existence) and (R-Identity) enables us to de-
fine the rigid plural embodiment xx/A as the unique rigid embod-
iment xx coextensive with the bare plurality xx, that is, xx ≡ xx,
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whose existence conditions require xx to exist and satisfy condition
A, that is, 2(Exx ↔ (Exx ∧ A(xx))).32 32 Given a definite descriptor operator
ι, we may think of xx/A as: ιxx∀x(x ≺
xx ↔ x ≺ xx) ∧ 2(Exx ↔ (Exx ∧
A(xx))). The thought, as usual, is
that we can uniformly eliminate every
occurrence of xx/A in the formal
framework in terms of the relevant
definite description.
Given this definition, as a special case of (R-Identity), we find:
xx/A == xx/B↔ 2(A(xx)↔ B(xx))
It is a consequence of (R-Identity) that given some material objects
xx, xx/A and xx/B are one and the same rigid plural embodiment if
A and B are necessarily coextensive conditions.
The theory of rigid plural embodiments is consistent: to find a
model, we can take a variable domain model for quantified plural
modal logic and let plural variables of different sorts range over
rigid modal profiles. The only difference is that xx, yy, ... range over a
special class of rigid modal profiles, which assign the same set S of
individuals to every world w, whose inner domain includes S.
3.2 Interlude: A Russellian Puzzle
There is still an inconsistent position in the vicinity. If a material
object m exemplifies condition F at a given world-time, then m/F
is a qua object which exists at a given world-time if and only if m
exemplifies F at the given world-time.33 And qua-objects may be 33 The concept of a qua-object can be
traced back to [Fine, 1982].governed by singular counterparts of the rigid plural existence and
identity postulates:
Qua Existence: If a material object m instantiates F at a world-time
w, then there is some object m/F, which exists at w if, and only if,
m instantiates F at w.
Qua Identity: m/F = n/G if and only if m = n and F and G are
necessarily coextensive.
But these two principles leave us again on the brink of inconsistency.
In fact, we need only a minimal consequence of the second postulate:
Qua Extensionality: m/F = n/G only if m = n and F and G are
coextensive.34 34 Compare this with the rigid exten-
sionality postulate we exploited in
section 2 to develop a problem for the
theory of rigid embodiment.
This observation is due to [Fairchild, 2017]. Say an object m instan-
tiates its own gloss if, and only if, there is some n and F such that
(i) m = n/F, and (ii) m instantiates F. Now, let R be the property a
material object m instantiates if, and only if, m does not instantiate its
own gloss. Given more than one material object, there is at least one
object m that instantiates R. By Qua Existence, there is a qua-object
m/R. But this turns out to be inconsistent with Qua Extensionality.35 35 See [Fairchild, 2017, section 1] for
detailed argument. She points out that
attractive as the extensionality principle
may seem, it is not forced upon one by
the hylomorphic picture that underlies
the existence postulate for qua objects.
It is instructive to check how the problem is avoided in the present
framework. We regiment Qua Existence by means of a particular
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instance of (R-Existence):
(Ex ∧ A(x))→ ∃xx(∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ x = m) ∧
2(Exx ↔ (Ex ∧ A(x)))) (Q-Existence)
But the key observation is that there is no reason to expect the rel-
evant qua-object to figure in the range of individual variables. The
rigid plural embodiment x/A generated by (Q-Existence) from a ma-
terial object x and a condition A may itself not be a material object in
the range of individual variables.36 This is parallel to the fact that a 36 x/A corresponds to the unique rigid
plural embodiment xx coextensive with
the bare plurality whose only member
is x and whose existence conditions are
given by the conditions under which x
exists and satisfies A(x).
rigid plural embodiment of two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom
as linked by certain covalent bonds does not itself lie in the range of
an individual variable.
Unlike (Q-Existence), the main effect of (R-Existence) is to gener-
ate an additional layer of rigid plural embodiments over an initial
domain of material objects — in much the way in which plural com-
prehension only guarantees a layer of bare pluralities over an an-
tecedently given domain of individuals.37 So, to the extent to which 37 One way to bring the point home is
to think of rigid plural embodiments
as derivative on some antecedently
given domain of material objects. This
is, incidentally, not very far removed
from a certain conception of qua objects
as derivative. The following remark in
[Fine, 1982, p. 103] is quite suggestive
in this respect:
The acts, as qua objects, are
in an obvious sense artificial
and derivative. They are not
genuinely “out there” in the
world, but they are formed
from what is out there by
means of an alliance with a
purely intensional element.
(It is tempting to say that
they are partly formed in our
minds, but this would be too
psychologistic.)
a water molecule is a material object, it is not to be identified with
the rigid plural embodiment that consists of two hydrogen atoms and
an oxygen atom as linked by certain covalent bonds. Nor is it clear
that rigid plural embodiments can themselves be parts of the material
objects of which molecules are parts. This may itself be regarded as a
bound on the scope of the theory of plural embodiments, but remem-
ber it was never meant to take the place of a hylomorphic account of
material objects.
The concern may arise at this point that we never have an op-
portunity to iterate the formation of plural embodiments out of an-
tecedently given plural embodiments. One may perhaps complain
that in contrast to this, a perfectly general account of groups ought
to allow for a measure of iteration: even if different faculty members
compose different committees, there is no reason to bar the existence
of a higher-level rigid plural embodiment of two committees as they
collaborate to a advance a common purpose. Maybe committees of
committees consist at a given world-time, of such higher-level rigid
plural embodiments.
There are two avenues of response available to us, one more con-
servative than the other. The more conservative response is to insist
pace [Uzquiano, 2004], for example, that the problem is only appar-
ent. For you may plausibly take a committee of committees to consist
at a given world-time of some individual representatives or proxies
for certain committees and you may take their remit at the relevant
world-time to be the coordination the committees they represent.
The more ambitious response is to expand the account of rigid
embodiments into a hierarchy of levels that allows for a measure of
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iteration. Some philosophers think that there is a form of quantifica-
tion that stands to plural quantification much like plural quantifica-
tion stands to singular quantification.38 We may following [Linnebo, 38 The thought is explored, for example,
in [Hazen, 1993], [Rayo, 2006], and
[Linnebo and Nicolas, 2008].
2017], call this style of quantification second-level plural quantification.
More generally, these philosophers suggest we may attempt to gen-
eralize this style of quantification to every finite level to obtain what
is for all intents and purposes a version of finite type theory. [Rayo,
2006] has indeed developed a formal framework for extensions of
plural quantification to finite levels and [Linnebo and Rayo, 2012]
have more recently expanded the framework to allow for transfinite
levels. Although we cannot hope to adjudicate the issue in this paper,
we note that it should be quite simple to supplement the version of
finite type theory to include quantification over generalizations of
rigid plural embodiments for each finite level. This would certainly
be able to accommodate higher-level rigid plural embodiments of the
sort mentioned above.
3.3 Rigid Plural Embodiments and their Parts
We relativized the relation an individual bears to a rigid plural em-
bodiment of which it is a member to a world-time. But we can still
ask whether rigid plural embodiments enter into atemporal mereo-
logical relations. Let us begin with the question of what is for a rigid
plural embodiment to be part of another. One may tentatively answer
that mm/A is part of nn/B if, and only if, part of what it is for nn
to satisfy B is for mm to satisfy A.39 On the present framework, the 39 This is in line with the account
outlined in [Fine, 1999]:
Rigid Parthood: The rigid embod-
iment (x1, x2, ...)/R is part of the
rigid embodiment (y1, y2, ...)/S if
part of what it is for y1, y2, ... to
stand in relation S is for x1, x2, ... to
stand in relation R.
satisfaction of conditions A and A by nn and mm is intimately con-
nected to the existence conditions of mm/A and nn/B. This suggests
the postulate:
Rigid Plural Parthood: The rigid embodiment mm/A is part of the
rigid embodiment nn/B if, and only if, nn/B exists at a world-
time w only if mm/A does.
More generally, if fA and fB are the modal profiles of two rigid plural
embodiments mm/A and nn/B, respectively, mm/A is part of nn/B
if, and only if, for every world-time w, fB(w) ⊆ fA(w).
In the special case in which two rigid plural embodiments are of
the form xx/A and xx/B, the less fragile plural embodiment will be
part of the more fragile one. By way of illustration, consider a case in
which Alice, Beth, and Charles line up at the box office, and compare
the rigid plural embodiments specified below:
• Alice, Beth, and Charles as they line at the box office (a, b, c/A) .40 40 We use list terms of the form a, b, c as
plural expressions for the bare plurality
whose members are exactly a, b, and c.• Alice, Beth, and Charles as they stand close to each other (a, b, c/B).
• Alice, Beth, and Charles as distinct from each other (a, b, c/C).
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Here we find three different rigid plural embodiments with different
existence conditions. They have been listed in order from more to less
fragile rigid plural embodiments; the last one is just the bare plurality
of Alice, Beth, and Charles. It follows that the last two rigid plural
embodiments are parts of their predecessors in the order.41 41 More formally, let fA, fB, and fC the
modal profiles corresponding to each
rigid plural embodiment. Since Alice,
Beth, and Charles can only line up at
the box office if they stand close to each
other, we have that the second is part of
the first — for each w, fB(w) is a subset
of fA(w). Moreover, the first is not part
of the second: Alice, Beth, and Charles
could at a world-time w, stand close to
each other and not line up at the box
office. This would be a case in which
fA(w) = ∅, whereas fB(w) = {a, b,
c}. So, it is not the case that for each
w, fA(w) is a subset of fB(w). Since for
each w, fA(w) ⊆ fB(w) ⊆ fC(w), the
bare plurality of Alice, Beth, Charles is
indeed part of the other two rigid plural
embodiments.
In the formal framework, we can articulate the thought as follows—
where α again is a placeholder for a plural or quasi-plural variable:
α ≤R β↔ α β ∧2(Eβ→ Eα) (≤R)
Notice that we cannot do without the first conjunct. Two rigid plural
embodiments may satisfy the second conjunct even if one is not part
of the other: necessarily, the bare plurality of Alice and Beth exist
only if the bare plurality of their singletons do, but we may not want
to allow the bare plurality of singletons of Alice and Beth to count as
part of the bare plurality of Alice and Beth.
Given (≤R), we are in a position to derive the axioms of core mere-
ology. Reflexivity and Transitivity fall out as immediate consequences
of the definition:
Reflexivity: α ≤R α
Transitivity: α ≤R β ∧ β ≤R γ→ α ≤R γ
For Reflexivity, it is trivial to note that α  α and of course 2(Eα →
Eα). Transitivity is a simple consequence of the transitivity of and
the definition: if α ≤R β and β ≤R γ, then since α β and β γ, we
have α  γ. Moreover, since 2(Eγ → Eβ) and 2(Eβ → Eα), we have
that 2(Eγ→ Eα). It follows that α ≤R γ.
The status of anti-symmetry is closely linked to the status of (R-
Identity). The latter principle guarantees the truth of all instances of
anti-symmetry where α and β are plural variables of either sort:
Anti-symmetry: α ≤R β ∧ β ≤R α→ α == β
If α and β are mutual parts, then given (≤R), they are coextensive,
that is, α ≡ β. Moreover, given (≤R) again, α and β enjoy the same
existence conditions, that is, 2(Eβ↔ Eα). It follows from (R-Identity)
that α == β.
We now define proper part, α <R β, and overlap, α ◦R β, as usual in
terms of part and identity:
α <R β := α ≤R β ∧ ¬α == β
α ◦R β := ∃γ(γ ≤R α ∧ γ ≤R β)
We formulate a principle of weak supplementation as usual:
Weak Supplementation: α <R β→ ∃γ(γ ≤R β ∧ ¬γ ◦R α).42 42 For discussion of supplementation
principles and the axioms of mereology
more generally, see [Simons, 1987] and
[Varzi, 2016].
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However, there is no reason to expect rigid plural embodiments to
be bound by this principle. To return to an earlier example, the bare
plurality of Alice, Beth, and Charles is part of more fragile rigid
plural embodiments that consist of them as they satisfy a certain
condition. The bare plurality of Alice, Beth, and Charles is a proper
part of the rigid plural embodiment that consists of them as they
stand next to each other. But notice that any rigid plural embodiment
that is part of the latter will have to contain some of Alice, Beth, and
Charles as members. So, they will have a bare plurality of them as a
part and this part will certainly overlap the bare plurality of Alice,
Beth, and Charles.
A supplementation principle is still available when we restrict
attention to bare pluralities. Unlike other rigid plural embodiments,
bare pluralities are governed by the heredity principle:
xx  yy→ 2(Eyy→ Exx) (H)
Given (≤R) and (H), the restriction of ≤R to bare pluralities col-
lapses into the relation. In other words:
xx ≤R yy↔ xx  yy
But when restricted to bare pluralities, is governed by the axioms
of classical extensional mereology.43 In particular, bare pluralities 43 This fact is proved and discussed by
[McKay, 2006, Chapter 6].satisfy a principle of strong supplementation:
Strong Supplementation: xx R yy→ ∃zz(zz ≤R xx ∧ ¬zz ◦R yy)
For suppose xx R yy. This means that ∃x(x ≺ xx ∧ ¬x ≺ yy). By
(Comprehension), ∃zz∀x(x ≺ zz ↔ x ≺ xx ∧ ¬x ≺ yy). But it is now
trivial to check that given such zz, zz ≤R xx and ¬zz ◦R yy.44 44 The contrast between rigid plural
embodiments and bare pluralities
is closely aligned with the contrast
[Goodman, 2016] draws between
material objects and matter. While
matter verifies the axioms of classical
extensional mereology, there is no
reason to expect material objects to
verify weak supplementation: the statue
includes the clay as a proper part, but
every part of the statue overlaps the
clay. And this is perfectly compatible
with the assumption that parthood is
reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric
on the domain of material objects. In
particular, there is no reason to think
that the statue is part of the clay even if
the clay is part of the statue.
By appeal to (Comprehension), we are in a position to derive a
principle of unrestricted fusion for bare pluralities:
Unrestricted Fusion: ∃xxϕ(xx) → ∃xx(∀yy(ϕ(yy) → yy ≤R
xx) ∧ ∀yy(yy ≤R xx → ∃zz(ϕ(zz) ∧ yy ◦R zz)))
For suppose some xx are such that ϕ(xx). By (Comprehension)
again, ∃uu∀x(x ≺ uu ↔ ∃yy(ϕ(yy) ∧ x ≺ yy)). Fix uu as the
objects in question. If some yy are such that ϕ(yy), then of course
yy  uu. Moreover, if some yy are such that yy  uu, then there are
some zz such that ϕ(zz) and for some x, x ≺ zz and x ≺ yy.
We cannot expect ≤R to be bound by classical mereology once
we lift the restriction to bare pluralities: weak supplementation fails
for rigid plural embodiments. It is natural to ask whether we have a
fusion principle for them. We begin with two comments.
The first observation is that (Comprehension) is not enough to
justify the existence of fusions of rigid plural embodiments. For
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a simple example, consider two rigid plural embodiments of the
form xx/A and yy/B. By (Comprehension), there is a unique bare
plurality xx + yy, which fuses xx and yy.45 But there is no guarantee 45 Since classical extensional mereology
is true of bare pluralities, we are free to
introduce xx + yy to refer to the unique
fusion of the two bare pluralities. By
(Comprehension), ∃zz∀x(x ≺ zz ↔ x ≺
xx ∨ x ≺ yy). This is a bare plurality
that includes every member of xx, every
member of yy, and nothing that is not a
member of xx or a member of yy.
that the bare plurality xx + yy should include either rigid plural
embodiment xx/A or yy/B as parts: maybe there is a world-time w
at which xx + yy exist but neither xx satisfies A nor does yy satisfy B.
Even if xx + yy fails to include xx/A and yy/B as parts, there is a
rigid plural embodiment xx+ yy/C based on xx+ yy, which includes
the other two as parts.46 This is a rigid plural embodiment, which
46 Let C(uu) be the plural condition:
xx  uu ∧ yy uu ∧ A(xx) ∧ B(yy).consists of xx + yy as they fuse xx and yy and xx are A and yy are B;
its existence at a world-time at which the other two exist, however, is
guaranteed by (R-Existence).
The second comment is that absent supplementation, there is no
hope for uniqueness. The rigid plural embodiment that consists of
xx + yy as they fuse xx and yy and xx are A and yy are B is only
one fusion of the initial rigid plural embodiments but there are many
others. In general, if S is some formula such that
2(S→ A(xx) ∧ B(yy)),
then by (R-Identity), there is a rigid plural embodiment, which con-
sists of xx + yy as they are such that S. But there will generally be
choices of S, which entail but are not entailed by the conjunction
A(xx) ∧ B(yy).47 Clearly, xx/A and yy/B are parts of xx + yy/S. 47 S could be the conjunction of A(xx) ∧
B(yy) with some merely contingent
truth.
And for a rigid plural embodiments zz to be part of xx + yy/S, it
must overlap at least one of xx/A and yy/B.
This suggests an informal line of argument for unrestricted fusion
for rigid plural embodiments:
Unrestricted Fusion: ∃αϕ(α) → ∃α(∀β(ϕ(β) → β ≤ α) ∧ ∀β(β ≤
α→ ∃γ(ϕ(γ) ∧ β ◦ γ)))
For suppose some rigid plural embodiment α satisfies condition ϕ at
a world-time w. And consider the fusion of bare pluralities coexten-
sive with a rigid plural embodiment for which the condition obtains.
This fusion exists by unrestricted comprehension for bare plurali-
ties. Consider the fusion of the bare pluralities coextensive with a
rigid plural embodiment of the relevant sort, and find a condition
that is only satisfied in the world-time of evaluation.48 There is, by 48 One may be able to turn this into
a formal argument in a higher-order
framework in which we have proposi-
tional variables of the form X, Y, Z, ...
which correspond to 0-place predicates
to which we may assign a proposition.
So, if uu is the fusion fo the bare plu-
ralities coextensive with a rigid plural
embodiment that satisfies the condition,
then we want to look at uu/X under an
assignment on which X is mapped to
a world-time proposition that is true at
exactly w.
(R-Existence), a rigid plural embodiment which consists of the mem-
bers of this bare plurality as the relevant condition is satisfied. This
rigid plural embodiment is extremely fragile as it only exists at the
world-time of evaluation, but this fragility is precisely what accounts
for the fact that it includes as parts every rigid plural embodiment of
the relevant sort.
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4 A Theory of Variable Plural Embodiments
Groups are not rigid plural embodiments, but they are nevertheless
constituted by them at each world-time at which they exist. A com-
mittee consists at a given world-time, of some individuals united
by a common purpose, a principle of organization, and a set of con-
ventional rules and procedures — a rigid plural embodiment. The
individual members are a manifestation of the complex plural condi-
tion we associate with a committee.
To accommodate groups, we require the concept of a variable
plural embodiment. This is a plural generalization of the concept
of variable embodiment as originally introduced by [Fine, 1999].
Given a functional principle of generation F, which assigns at most
one material object to a world-time w, we may consider a variable
embodiment /F/, which is a material object constituted at a given
world-time w, by whatever object F assigns to w, F(w).49 [Fine, 1999] 49 In more precise terms, [Fine, 1999] in-
cludes a principle of variable existence:
Variable Existence: If F is a functional
principle, then there exists a variable
embodiment /F/, which, at a given
time t, exists iff some individual
material object, F(t), is the mani-
festation of the condition F at t in
which case it constitutes the variable
embodiment at t.
suggests a river, for example, is a variable embodiment generated
by a principle of generation which picks out a portion of water at a
given time.50
50 Or one may conceive of a car as a
variable embodiment generated by a
functional principle that maps a time to
a rigid embodiment of certain car-parts
as they stand in an appropriate relation.
We can generalize the account of plural embodiments to include
variable plural embodiments. Call a plural condition F functional if,
and only if, it is satisfied by at most one bare plurality mm at each
world-time w. Such a functional condition provides a principle of
generation for a variable plural embodiment. We may conceive of
the queue at the box office as a variable plural embodiment, whose
manifestation at a given world-time w is given by the individuals
that exemplify the functional condition in question. Moreover, at w,
we may take the queue to be constituted by the individuals as they
manifest the functional condition associated with the queue.
The difference between a queue and a committee is largely due to
the complexity of the functional condition they involve: in the case
of a committee, the principle of generation consists of a principle of
organization in addition with a set of rules and procedures and a
certain purpose. In general:
Variable Plural Existence: If F is a functional plural condition, then
there is a variable embodiment /F/, which exists at a world-time
if, and only if, F is satisfied by at most one bare plurality mm of
material objects at the world-time. Moreover, /F/ is, at a world-
time w, constituted by the rigid embodiment mm/F, which con-
sists of the individuals mm that F map to w as they exemplify
condition F at the world-time in question.
This leaves open of course what are the identity conditions for vari-
able plural embodiments. For a simple suggestion, consider:
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Variable Plural Identity: A variable plural embodiment /F/ is the
same as a variable plural embodiment /G/ if and only if F is the
same principle of generation as G.
The reason membership to a group /F/ may be temporary or contin-
gent is that its principle of generation F may assign different individ-
uals to different world-times. The queue at the box office has many
of its members only temporarily and contingently because it maps
different bare pluralities to different world-times.
As for coincidence, two different groups /F/ and /G/ may re-
main different even if their respective principles of generation hap-
pen to assign the very same individuals to a given world-time w: mm
are both the members of F(w) and G(w). This would be a case in
which /F/ and /G/ would be constituted by two coextensive rigid
plural embodiments, that is, mm/F and mm/G respectively. These
rigid plural embodiments would still differ in virtue of the fact that
they have a different modal profile.
By way of illustration, the search and the graduate committee are
guided by different purposes, a different principle of organization,
and a different set of rules and procedures. But their respective prin-
ciples of generation may be satisfied by the same bare plurality of
individuals at a given world-time w: at w, they would be constituted
by rigid plural embodiments with the same individual members.51 51 Notice that two principles of gen-
eration can still differ even if they are
satisfied by the same bare plurality at
each and every time within a given
world.
One key difference between variable and rigid plural embodiments
has to do with the modal profiles they exemplify. A functional plu-
ral condition F maps world-times to sets of individuals that exist
at those world-times, that is, the set of individuals that satisfy the
condition in question. Call a function F from world-times to sets of
objects that exist at those world-times a variable modal profile if, and
only if, for some w, F(w) 6= ∅. To each variable modal profile F, there
corresponds a variable plural embodiment /F/, which is manifested
at w by exactly the members mm of F(w) and constituted at w by
mm/F. This is a rigid plural embodiment, whose modal profile f is
such that for each world-time u other than w:
f (u) =
F(w) if F(w) = F(u)∅ otherwise.
That is mm/F exist at a world-time u if the objects mm that F maps
to w exist and verify F at u. Consider the queue at the box office
again. For simplicity, suppose that two individuals, a and b, queue at
a given world-time w1 and two more b and c queue at w2 and w3. No
individuals, however, queue at the box office at any other world-time.
In this case, the principle of generation F is such that F(w1) = {a, b},
F(w2) = {b, c}, F(w3) = {b, c} and F(u) = ∅ for each other world-
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time u. Now, /F/ is constituted by the rigid embodiment a, b/F at w1
and b, c/F at w2 and w3.
The variable existence and identity postulates come down to this:
Every variable modal profile is exemplified by a unique variable plural embodi-
ment.
4.1 A Formal Framework
We can extend the formal framework to accommodate variable plural
embodiments. To each rigid plural embodiment there corresponds
a variable plural embodiment with the same modal profile. So, we
could in principle conceive of a rigid embodiment as a special case of
a variable embodiment, one whose principle of generation is satisfied
by the same bare plurality at every world at which it is satisfied. This
invites the question again whether to add yet another sort of variable
for variable plural embodiments or simply expand the range of the
newly added variables to range over variable plural embodiments.
Similar considerations as above suggest we add a new style of vari-
able for variable plural embodiments in the interest of perspicuity.52 52 Strictly speaking, we could, if we
wanted, recast the entire framework
with a single sort of variable for vari-
able plural embodiments as rigid
plural embodiments are special case
of them, bare pluralities are a special
case of rigid plural embodiments, and
individuals are a special case of bare
pluralities.
We introduce another style of variable, xx, yy, zz, ..., to range over
variable plural embodiments. Next we introduce a binary relational
expression, xx / xx, which is implicitly relativized to a world-time
and read: “xx constitutes xx”.
This temporary — and contingent — constitution relation is gov-
erned by a uniqueness condition:
xx / xx → ∀yy(yy / xx → xx == yy) (U)
This says that at most one rigid plural embodiment constitutes a
given variable plural embodiment at a given world-time.
We can define a “one of” predicate for the new style of variable in
terms of ≺ as governed by the principle:
x ≺V xx ↔ ∃xx(xx / xx ∧ x ≺ xx) (≺V)
Variable plural embodiments are not extensional: at a given world-
time, the queue at the box office may share all of its members with
the search committee and nevertheless remain different from it.
We define an existence predicate E for the new style of variable
in terms of constitution. For a variable plural embodiment to exist
at a world-time is for some bare plurality to manifest the functional
condition associated with it:
Exx ↔ ∃xx (Exx ∧ xx / xx) (EV)
Variable embodiments are not rigid. Alice may be one of the mem-
bers of the committee at a given time, she is not necessarily one of
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them. She would have failed to be one of them at the given time had
she declined the invitation to serve. And even if Beth is not one of
members of the committee at a given time, she might have been one
had she joined the committee earlier.
At this stage, we are in a position to offer a schematic regimenta-
tion of the variable plural existence postulate. First, let us introduce
Func(A) as an abbreviation for the complex formula:
2∀xx(A(xx)→ ∀yy(A(yy)↔ yy = xx))
This tells us that A is a plural condition satisfied by at most one
bare plurality at each world-time. We may now regiment a variable
existence postulate as follows:
Func(A)→ 2∀xx(A(xx) ∧ Exx →
∃xx2∀xx(xx / xx ↔ xx == xx/A)) (V-Existence)
Whenever a functional plural condition A is exemplified by a bare
plurality that exists, there is a variable plural embodiment that is
necessarily constituted by the rigid plural embodiment, if there is
one, that consists of the individuals that satisfy A as they exemplify
the condition.53 53 Recall the definition of xx/A as the
rigid plural embodiment consisting of
xx as they exemplify A.
Two variable plural embodiments are the same only if they deter-
mine the same principle of generation. But if we continue to identify
necessarily equivalent conditions, we may simply identify variable
plural embodiments with the same constitution conditions:
xx == yy↔ 2∀xx(xx / xx ↔ yy / yy) (V-Identity)
It is a simple matter to modify the models of the theory of rigid
plural embodiments to accommodate the existence and identity pos-
tulates: variable plural embodiment variables are taken to range over
variable modal profiles. So, consistency again is not an issue with the
framework.
4.2 Variable Plural Embodiments and their Parts
There are at least two ways in which something may be a part of a
variable plural embodiment. A rigid plural embodiment may be a
part of the variable embodiment at a certain world-time, for example,
the search committee may include the members of the senior search
committee at one world-time even if they are not part of the commit-
tee at another time. But a variable plural committee may be part of
another variable plural committee in a way that is not relative to a
world-time: the senior search committee is part of the senior commit-
tee, but there is no reason to think of this relation as temporary.
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To accommodate the first case, we will take a variable plural em-
bodiment /F/ to have as parts at a given world-time w whatever
rigid plural embodiments stand in the timeless relation ≤R to the
rigid plural embodiment mm/F that constitutes /F/ at w:
First Variable Plural Parthood Postulate: If /F/ is constituted by a
rigid plural embodiment mm/F at a world-time w, then all parts of
mm/F are themselves parts of /F/ at w.
By way of example, compare the queue at the box office, itself a vari-
able plural embodiment, with the rigid plural embodiments below:
• Alice, Beth, and Charles as they queue at the box office
• Alice, Beth, and Charles as they stand close to each other
• Alice, Beth and Charles as they are distinct from each other
If at a given world-time w the queue at the box office consists of the
rigid plural embodiment of Alice, Beth, and Charles as they queue
at the box office, then every parts of the rigid plural embodiment
becomes at w, part of the queue. In particular, each of the other two
rigid plural embodiments count as parts of the queue at w.
More formally:
yy ≤′R xx ↔ ∃xx(xx / xx ∧ yy ≤R xx) (≤′R)
We now look at the second type of case. Sometimes a variable
plural embodiment is part of another in a way that is not to be rela-
tivized to a world-time. Even if the senior search committee shares
exactly the same members as the queue at the box office, we want to
make sense of the fact that only one of them can be said to be part of
the search committee. The queue is never a part of the search com-
mittee — even if the bare plurality of its members may at a given
world-time be part of the search committee.
One simple suggestion at this point is to take one to be part of
another if and only if necessarily, whatever constitutes one is part of
whatever constitutes the other.
Second Variable Plural Parthood Postulate: A variable plural embod-
iment /F/ is part of a variable plural embodiment /G/ if and
only if for each and every world-time w, the rigid plural embod-
iment mm/F that constitutes /F/ at w is part of the rigid plural
embodiment nn/G that constitutes /G/ at w.
The search committee may consist of two subcommittees devoted
to different searches. Each search committee is part of the larger
committee because necessarily, whatever rigid plural embodiment
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constitutes the former is part of whatever rigid plural embodiment
constitutes the latter. So, in particular, being a subcommittee of a
committee is not merely a matter of having some of its members as
members. In symbols:
xx ≤V yy↔ 2∀xx∀yy(xx / xx ∧ yy / yy→ xx ≤R yy) (≤V)
By (U) above, we know that / is guaranteed to be a functional rela-
tion: each variable plural embodiment is constituted by at most one
bare plurality at a given world-time w. This observation plays a role
in the derivability of the axioms of core mereology for ≤V :
Reflexivity: xx ≤V xx
Transitivity: xx ≤V yy ∧ yy ≤V zz→ xx ≤V zz
Anti-symmetry: xx ≤V yy ∧ yy ≤V xx → xx == yy
Consider reflexivity, first. Since necessarily, xx is necessarily consti-
tuted by one and the same rigid plural embodiment as xx, whatever
constitutes one at each given world-time is trivially part of what
constitutes the other. Thus xx is part of xx.
Transitivity is another simple consequence of the functionality
of . and the transitivity of ≤R. Given three variable plural embod-
iments xx, yy, and zz, If xx is part of yy, then necessarily, whatever
rigid plural embodiment constitutes xx at a world-time w is part of
whatever constitutes yy at w. And if yy is part of zz, then necessarily,
whatever rigid plural embodiment constitutes yy at a world-time w is
part of whatever constitutes zz at w. By transitivity of ≤R, whatever
rigid plural embodiment constitutes xx at a world-time w is part of
whatever constitutes zz at w.
As for anti-symmetry, suppose that necessarily, whatever rigid plu-
ral embodiment constitutes xx at a world-time w is part of whatever
constitutes yy at w, and vice versa. Since, by (U), the rigid plural em-
bodiments that constitute xx and yy, respectively, are mutual parts
of each other, by anti-symmetry for ≤R, they are one at the same
at each world-time at which the variable plural embodiments exist.
So, by (V-Identity), xx and xx are one and the same variable plural
embodiment.
Unlike rigid plural embodiments, however, variable plural embodi-
ments are governed by strong supplementation:
Strong Supplementation: xx V yy→ ∃zz(zz ≤V xx ∧ ¬zz ◦V yy)
To justify this claim, suppose that a variable plural embodiment xx
is not part of another yy. Given (≤V), it is possible for xx to be con-
stituted by a rigid plural embodiment xx that is not part of whatever
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rigid plural embodiment yy constitutes yy at the relevant world-time.
But consider the condition: ∀x(x ≺ xx ↔ (x ≺V xx ∧ x ⊀V yy)). This
is a functional condition satisfied at each given world-time w by the
bare plurality xx of members of xx that are not members of yy. Since
the condition is indeed satisfied by some individuals at the world of
evaluation, by (V-Existence), there is a variable plural embodiment
zz generated by the condition. It is routine to check that the variable
embodiment in question is part of xx but fails to overlap yy.
Strong supplementation entails a principle of extensionality for
variable plural embodiments:
Extensionality: ∀zz(zz ≤V xx ↔ zz ≤V xx)→ xx == yy
This tells us that two variable plural embodiments are one and the
same if, and only if, they have the same variable plural embodiments
as parts. But given the distinction between rigid and variable plural
embodiments, this form of extensionality is much weaker than it may
seem. This principle is perfectly consistent with the observation that
two variable plural embodiments may share exactly the same rigid
plural parts and nevertheless remain numerically distinct.54 54 It is not, for example, to be confused
with two considerably stronger but false
principles:
Extensionality: ∀zz(zz ≤R xx ↔
zz ≤R xx)→ xx == yy
There is no reason to expect this form
of extensionality to hold, since two
different variable plural embodiments
may at a given world-time, share all of
their rigid plural parts and nevertheless
remain different. Likewise for an even
less plausible principle:
Extensionality: ∀zz(zz ≤R xx ↔
zz ≤R xx)→ xx == yy
Two variable plural embodiments may
share the same material parts at a given
world-time w and nevertheless remain
numerically distinct.
In addition to this, it is not unreasonable to assume a principle of
unrestricted composition:
Unrestricted Fusion: ∃xxϕ(xx) → ∃xx(∀yy(ϕ(yy) → yy ≤V
xx) ∧ ∀yy(yy ≤V xx → ∃zz(ϕ(zz) ∧ yy ◦V zz)))
For suppose some xx are such that ϕ(xx). And consider the condi-
tion a bare plurality xx satisfies when it fuses the bare pluralities
that are coextensive with one or another variable plural embodi-
ment satisfying ϕ. This is a functional condition since bare pluralities
are governed by classical extensional mereology. Now: there is by
(Comprehension), a bare plurality that satisfies this condition, which
means, by (V-Existence), that there is a variable plural embodiment
which is necessarily constituted by rigid plural embodiments consist-
ing of bare pluralities satisfying the functional condition in question.
To summarize, we have characterized, first, ≤′R as a temporary and
contingent relation a rigid plural embodiment may bear to a variable
plural embodiment at a given world-time. Unlike this relation, ≤V is
not to be relativized to a world-time and turns out to be governed by
the axioms of classical mereology.
5 Conclusion
It is time to take stock. We have suggested a hylomorphic conception
of groups conceived not as complex material objects over and above
their members, but rather as variable plural embodiments constituted
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by rigid plural embodiments at a given world-time. Rigid plural em-
bodiments in turn consist of some individuals as they exemplify a
certain complex condition. We should now make sure that the iden-
tification of groups with variable plural embodiments does justice to
the three constraints we outlined at the outset.
We note first that membership to a group — conceived as vari-
able plural embodiment — may be temporary and contingent. This
is simply because some individuals may satisfy the functional con-
dition that generates the relevant variable plural embodiment we
identify with the group only temporarily and contingently. While
Alice, Beth, and Charles may at a given world-time satisfy the prin-
ciple of generation for a queue at the box office, they need not do so
at other world-times. Likewise for a committee. The fact that some
individuals satisfy the complex functional condition associated with
the variable plural embodiment with which we have identified the
committee is perfectly compatible with the fact that other individuals
do so at some other world-times.
The identification of groups with variable plural embodiments is
similarly tailored to accommodate coincidence. Although the search
and graduate committees are generated by two different functional
conditions, it should be no surprise that the same individuals can,
at a given world-time, satisfy one and the other. The functional con-
ditions remain numerically different because it is possible for them
to be satisfied by two different bare pluralities of individuals. So,
the very same individuals who meet on Tuesday as the members of
the search committee may meet on Thursday as the members of the
graduate committee.
The account of what it is for an individual to be a member of a
group at a given world-time is for the individual to be one of some
individuals satisfying a complex condition, which is itself a principle
of generation for the variable plural embodiment with which we have
the group. This account illuminates the difference between highly
structured groups like committees and less cohesive groups like
queues. The main difference is to be located in the principles of gen-
eration corresponding to each and whether or not they are a source
of shared intentionality and other complex features of committees.
Last, but not least, we have outlined an account of what it is for a
group to be part of another. More generally, we have distinguished at
least two different ways in which something may be part of a group.
One of them is to be relativized to a world-time as it has to do with
what is part of whatever constitutes the variable embodiment at a
world-time. The other, however, requires no such relativization: one
group is part of another if and only if for each and every world-
time, whatever rigid plural embodiment constitutes one is part of
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whatever rigid plural embodiment constitutes the second. While the
admissions committee may be coextensive with the senior search
committee, which is itself part of the search committee, the admis-
sions committee is itself not part of the search committee. The reason
is simple: the admissions committee may at a given world-time w
be constituted by a rigid plural embodiment that is not itself part of
whatever rigid plural embodiment constitutes the search committee
at w.
The formal regimentation of the framework is an extension of
modal quantified plural logic for which it is simple to find models,
which means that unlike traditional formulations of hylomorphism,
the present account is perfectly consistent. The mere consistency
of the proposal is, by itself, not a reason to adopt it. However, we
have suggested that the concept of a plural embodiment should be
attractive to proponents of hylomorphic composition, and once it
becomes available, it enables us to provide an account of groups
that appears to do better than extant accounts when it comes to the
constraints we outlined at the outset and the further judgment that at
a given world-time, a group is nothing over and above the individual
members as they satisfy a certain condition.
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